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Salvi: Monasky’s Totality of Circumstances

MONASKY’S TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES IS VAGUE – THE
CHILD’S PERSPECTIVE SHOULD BE THE MAIN TEST
Sabrina Salvi*
ABSTRACT
After decades of confusion, the Supreme Court ruled on child
custody in an international setting in Monasky v. Taglieri,1 by
attempting to establish the definition of a child’s “habitual residence.” 2
The Court held that a child’s “residence in a particular country can be
deemed ‘habitual, however, only when her residence there is more than
transitory.’”3 Further, the Court stated that, ‘“[h]abitual’ implies
customary, usual, of the nature of a habit.”’ 4 However, the Supreme
Court’s ruling remains unclear.
The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction (“HCCAICA” or “The Hague
Convention”), which is adopted in ninety-eight states and one regional
organization,5 provides that children must be returned to their habitual
residence in the event of being wrongfully removed or retained in a
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foreign country by one of their parents.6 Courts struggle with the
difficult task of determining a child’s habitual residence.

6

Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25,
1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter HCCAICA Convention].
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INTRODUCTION

One view in the circuit split is that children lack the material
capacity to decide where they will reside after their parents split. 7
However, the opposing view gives greater decision-making authority
to the child by viewing the situation from the child’s perspective. 8
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that a child’s habitual residence
under the Hague Convention depended upon the totality of the
circumstances specific to the case, not on the actual agreement
between the parents on where to raise their child.9 The Supreme
Court’s Monasky ruling is silent as to whether children should have a
say about where they believe that their habitual residence is located, or
if children do have a say, how much weight should be given to the
child’s opinion. The Court, instead, took a broad approach, which
leaves little guidance for the lower courts. It is important for children
to decide where their habitual residence is. Children are the best
indicators of their habitual residence because their choice is based on
where they feel most at home. The one exception to the child’s
preference should be when a child is an infant and lacks the ability to
vocalize the location of his or her residence. In a case dealing with an
infant, other factors should be given greater weight than the child’s
perspective.
In the United States, roughly “50% of American children will
be witnesses to the break-up of their parent’s marriage.”10 Further,
teenagers struggling with their parents’ divorce are said to be 300%
more likely to need psychological help when compared to teenagers
“who are in stable and intact nuclear families.”11 This Note will focus
on a parent taking his or her child to a foreign nation, especially
considering the high rate of divorce in the United States and the ease
of international travel due to advanced transportation technology

7

Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 132 (2d Cir. 2005); Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 1247
(11th Cir. 2004); Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2004).
8
Cohen v. Cohen, 858 F.3d 1150, 1154 (8th Cir. 2017).
9
Monasky, 140 S. Ct. at 728.
10
Jason Crowley, The Psychological Effects of Divorce on Children (and How to
Help Them Cope), SURVIVE DIVORCE, https://www.survivedivorce.com/divorceeffects-children (last visited Apr. 4, 2022).
11
Id.
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which make this issue particularly relevant. 12 To alleviate some of
these frightening statistics, it is crucial to allow children to decide
where they feel that their habitual residence is. This will give children
a voice on where they are most comfortable living, which may relieve
some of their stress.
The Court’s decision in Monasky left the circuit courts with a
loose guideline and great uncertainty regarding how to decide cases
relating to a child’s habitual residence. Ruling that a child’s habitual
residence is based on a totality of circumstances, the Court did not
resolve the issue as to whether the child’s perspective or the parent’s
last intent governs. The circuits that adopt the child’s perspective view
are going to continue to do so, and the circuits that adopt the parent’s
last shared intent will continue to adhere to that view. The lower courts
cannot use Monasky’s “totality of circumstance” ruling as a guide
because that ruling is not a bright line rule. Nor will either side of the
circuit split be persuaded to rule in the alternative manner. Therefore,
no change will occur from Monasky.
This Note has eight sections. Section II will address the
background and importance of the Hague Convention and what it
protects. Section III will discuss the major Supreme Court decision in
Monasky from February of 2020.13 Section IV will explore several
cases from the circuits that focus on parental intent and those that focus
on the child’s perspective, as well as the Seventh Circuit – which
implements both parental intent and the child’s perspective to
determine a child’s habitual residence. Section V will consider the
habitual residence of an infant and why the habitual residence should
also be based on the child’s perspective. Section VI will analyze the
future problems caused by the ruling in Monasky, which gives little
direction to lower courts in determining a child’s habitual residence.
Section VII will discuss why the vagueness of the Monasky ruling is
troublesome. Finally, in Section VIII, this Note will conclude that the
Supreme Court failed to make a proper ruling on the issue of habitual
residence and has left alarming uncertainty for future cases.

12

Preventing Children from Leaving the Country, AYO & IKEN (Oct. 11, 2018).,
https://www.18884mydivorce.com/child-custody-laws/preventing-children-fromleaving-the-country-passport-denial.
13
Monasky, 140 S. Ct. at 719.
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BACKGROUND AND IMPORTANCE OF THE HAGUE
CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
CHILD ABDUCTION

The HCCAICA was drafted to deter parental child abduction
at the international level. 14 It was especially directed towards the
“unilateral and unauthorized retention or removal of children by
someone close to them, such as parents, guardians, or family
members.”15 Before the HCCAICA was finalized, the problem of
parental child abduction was only dealt with on an individual level by
each country that adopted the Convention.16 Now, the Convention
focuses on an international level. The Convention aims to “protect
children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful
removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt
return to the State of their habitual residence.” 17 The Convention’s
main objectives are to “[s]ecure the prompt return of children
wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State; and to
ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one
Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting
States.”18 Another purpose of the HCCAICA is to create remedies for
international parental child abduction, even though there are very
few.19 Further, the HCCAICA prevents one party from gaining an
advantage by preserving the status quo. 20 Preserving the status quo
includes a mandatory return of a child to the state of the child’s habitual
residence.21 However, that statement is not as simple as it may seem
because habitual residence of a child was left undefined in the
HCCAICA.
This ambiguity has caused great difficulty for circuit courts in
recent years.22 A court facing a case under the HCCAICA will
typically address four questions to determine the location of a child’s
habitual residence.23 First, the court will examine when the child’s
14

HCCAICA Convention, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89.
Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2005).
16
See HCCAICA Convention, supra note 6, art. 7.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1064 (6th Cir. 1996).
20
See HCCAICA Convention, supra note 6.
21
Id.
22
Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719, 726 (2020).
23
Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 737 (7th Cir. 2013).
15
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removal or retention occurred. 24 Next, the court will look to the state
where the child habitually resided immediately before the removal or
retention occurred.25 Then, the court will decide whether the removal
or retention was in breach of the petitioning parent’s custody rights
according to the state law of the child’s habitual residence. 26 Lastly,
the court will decide whether the petitioning parent employed his or
her custody rights when the unlawful removal or retention took place. 27
Since the Convention’s purpose is to protect children who are
being taken by a parent in the middle of their parents’ divorce, the
Convention’s failure to define a child’s habitual residence is
problematic. Courts of most contracting nations evaluate two different
factors when considering habitual residence: (1) the child’s
perspective; and (2) the parents’ shared decision prior to the
dissolution of their marriage.28
Prior to 2020, courts in the United States disagreed about which
one of these factors is dispositive, and leading up to the Monasky
decision, courts struggled for decades to interpret the phrase “habitual
residence.”29 The Monasky Court did not define habitual residence;
instead, the Justices held that, under the Hague Convention, a child’s
habitual residence depends on the totality of circumstances. 30 Thus,
Monasky’s overly broad ruling did not provide a clear direction to the
lower courts.
III.

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT PRIOR TO MONASKY V. TAGLIERI
A.

“Parental Intent” Circuits

Prior to Monasky, courts including the Second Circuit,31 Ninth
Circuit,32 and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals 33 adopted the
24

Id.
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Morgan McDonald, Home Sweet Home? Determining Habitual Residence Within
the Meaning of the Hague Convention, 59 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 427, 429
(2018).
29
Id. at 430.
30
Monasky, 140 S. Ct. at 723.
31
Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2005).
32
Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2004).
33
Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2004).
25
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perspective that “children normally lack the material psychological
capacity wherewithal to decide where they will reside” when
interpreting habitual residence. 34 These circuits also agree with the
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Mozes, which held that parental intent
should be given greater weight when determining habitual residence
of a child.35
In Gitter v. Gitter,36 the Second Circuit held that “courts should
begin their analysis of a child’s ‘habitual residence’ for purposes of
The Hague Convention by considering the relevant intentions of the
child’s parents.”37 This case arose after the plaintiff, an Israeli citizen,
persuaded his wife, who also was born in Israel but left when she was
an infant, to live in Israel for a year.38 Gitter, his wife, and their young
child moved to Israel in 2000. 39 The Gitters and their young son visited
the United States, and, when visiting, Mrs. Gitter expressed her desire
to move back to New York.40 In 2002, Mrs. Gitter went to visit the
United States with her son, but did not return to Israel.41 In 2003, Mr.
Gitter filed a petition seeking the son’s return to Israel under the Hague
Convention.42 The District Court for the Eastern District of New York
denied his petition and ruled that the son’s habitual residence was in
the United States. 43 The Second Circuit held that parental intent by
itself cannot establish a child’s habitual residence, but it is given a
much greater weight than the child’s perspective.44 This court stated
that it “specifically focus[es] on the intent of the person or persons
entitled to fix the place of the child’s residence, which is likely to be
the parents in most cases.”45 Further, the court discussed that children
normally lack the capacity to decide where their habitual residence is. 46
Most of what this court relied on when coming to a holding has now

34

Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id.
36
Gitter, 396 F.3d 124.
37
Id. at 132.
38
Id. at 128.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 129.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 133.
45
Id. at 132.
46
Id. at 133.
35
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been overruled by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Monasky v.
Taglieri.
Following the same rule, Papakosmas v. Papakosmas47 was
decided two years later by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In this
case, Dimitris and Yvette were married in Las Vegas, Nevada in 1994,
and subsequently resided in Los Angeles, California, where they had
two children in 1995 and 1997, respectively.48 Mr. and Mrs.
Papakosmas owned and operated two hotels in Hollywood,
California.49 They also leased and operated a third hotel in
Hollywood.50 After seven years of living in California, in December
of 2003, the Papakosmas family left California and went to Dimitris’s
birth country, Greece.51
The family arrived days before Christmas and spent the
holidays with Dimitris’s family. 52 After two weeks of staying with
Dimitris’s family, the Papakosmas family traveled three hours to
Athens, where Dimitris had rented an apartment for them to stay in. 53
Soon after the family moved into this apartment, Dimitris and Yvette’s
relationship began to suffer. 54 Yvette’s daughter told Yvette that
Dimitris had a mistress from the United States who was also in
Greece.55 Further, Dimitris was incredibly controlling. 56 He
controlled everything that the couple had, including the family’s
passports and business ventures.57 Yvette claimed that she learned one
of their hotels was sold the month before her trip to Greece, and did
not know of the other hotel sale until the family arrived in Greece. 58
Yvette considered leaving Greece after learning of Dimitris’s mistress,
but she could not obtain her and her children’s passports.59 As a result,
she sought help from the Embassy, which gave her plane tickets and

47

483 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 619.
49
Id. at 620.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 620.
48
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passports for her and her children to travel to the United States on April
23, 2004.60
In August 2004, Dimitris filed an action under the HCCAICA
requesting the children to be returned to Greece. 61 Subsequent to the
evidentiary hearing, the District Court for the Central District of
California denied Dimitris’s petition.62 The district court found that
the couple moved to Greece on a conditional basis.63 Moreover, the
couple lacked shared intent to abandon their California residence. 64
Dimitris appealed the district court’s ruling. 65
The district court in Papakosmas focused heavily on the
parents’ last shared intent. 66 First, the district court determined
whether “there was a settled intention to abandon their prior habitual
residence.”67 The court answered this question in the negative. 68
Although the court relied heavily on the parents’ shared intent, it also
considered factors such as actual change in geography and a passage
of time sufficient for acclimatization.69 The court, citing Mozes, stated
“[h]abitual residence is intended to be a description of a factual state
of affairs, and a child can lose its habitual attachment to a place even
without a parent’s consent.”70
Accordingly, even when the settled intent of a child’s parents
is not clear, “a district court should find a change in habitual residence
if the objective facts point unequivocally to a person’s ordinary or
habitual residence being in a particular place.” 71 Under this standard,
the circuit court must accept the district court’s historical or narrative
facts unless they are deemed to be clearly erroneous. 72 The question
of whether the parents’ settled intention was to abandon their prior
residence is a question of fact and the circuit court must defer to the

60

Id.
Id.
62
Id. at 621.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 622.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. (citing Moses, 239 F.3d at 1081).
71
Id. (quoting Zenel v. Haddow, 1993 S.L.T. 975, 979 (Scot. 1st Div.)).
72
Id. at 622-23.
61
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district court.73 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
conclusion that the family’s move to Greece was conditional, and it
agreed with the district court that four months in Greece was
insufficient to acclimatize the children to Greece. 74 This ruling is
consistent with the reasoning that other courts have given when
interpreting the language of the Hague Convention. 75
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals followed the same
approach in Ruiz v. Tenorio.76 In this case, Melissa Tenorio met Juan
Ruiz when she was studying abroad in Mexico.77 Juan was born in
Mexico and resided there. 78 In May of 1992, Melissa found out she
was pregnant, but she returned home to Minnesota where she lived and
she birthed the child.79 Juan went to live with Melissa at her parents’
house in Minnesota and they got married. 80 In 1998, she gave birth to
their second child and they moved into an apartment on their own.81
The marriage was no longer a happy one, and in an attempt to save it,
the couple decided to move to Mexico in 2000, after living in the
United States for seven years.82 At the time of the move, which was
largely financed by Juan’s father, Juan stated that the move was just
for a trial period. 83 At first, the family lived with Juan’s family but
eventually moved into their own apartment due to tension between
Melissa and Juan’s mother. 84 Melissa traveled to the United States
numerous times both alone or with her children, until May 2003, when
she took her children to the United States and did not return. 85
Juan filed a petition for wrongful removal under the Hague
Convention in July 2003.86 The District Court for the Middle District
of Florida held a hearing in August 2003 and denied Juan’s petition.87
The district court held that Juan was unsuccessful in proving that the
73

Id.
Id. at 628.
75
Id. at 625.
76
392 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2004).
77
Id. at 1249.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 1250.
86
Id.
87
Id.
74
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children’s habitual residence was in Mexico. 88 The district court relied
heavily on the fact that the couple moved to Mexico in an attempt to
save their marriage, with the idea that they would return to the United
States if they were unsuccessful.89 After only six months in Mexico,
their relationship did not work out. 90 Further, the court held that the
pair never shared intent to make Mexico the habitual residence of their
children, but rather a temporary home during the time that the couple
was trying to save their marriage. 91 Juan appealed the decision. 92
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with both the Second and Ninth
Circuits and held that the parents’ settled intention is a crucial factor,
but it cannot alone decide “habitual residence.” 93 Like the other two
circuits, the Eleventh Circuit considered additional factors aside from
intent including the need for “an actual change in geography and the
passage of a sufficient length of time for the child to have become
acclimatized.”94 Here, there was no shared intent because Juan and
Melissa agreed to live together in Mexico for a probationary period. 95
A variety of objective factors further demonstrated Melissa’s lack of
intent to make her move to Mexico a permanent one.96 Since the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court did not err in deciding
that the parents had no shared intent, the court then began to look at
relevant objective factors. 97 The Eleventh Circuit held that, although
this case was a close case, it could not conclude that the objective facts
in the instant case were sufficient to indicate that the habitual residence
of the children in the United States was abandoned and changed to
Mexico.98

88

Id.
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 1251.
93
Id. at 1253.
94
Id. (quoting Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1078).
95
Id. at 1254.
96
Id. (“Melissa’s lack of intention to move permanently to Mexico: she retained bank
accounts and credit cards in the United States; she had her American mail forwarded
to an American address and not to Mexico; and she moved her nursing license to
Florida shortly after she moved to Mexico.”).
97
Id.
98
Id. at 1259.
89
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“Child’s Perspective” Circuits

The Third,99 Sixth,100 and Eighth Circuit courts101 took a
different approach to this issue. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,
in Friedrich v. Friedrich,102 focused on habitual residence from the
child’s perspective, downplaying the parental intent. 103 The Third and
Eighth Circuits were both influenced by the Friedrich holding to adopt
the child’s perspective approach in deciding habitual residence
cases.104 In Friedrich, the child, Thomas, was born in Germany. 105
Thomas’s mother was an American servicewoman stationed in
Germany and his father, Emanuel Friedrich, was a citizen of
Germany.106 Due to the nature of Mrs. Friedrich’s occupation, Thomas
spent a majority of the time in the physical custody of Mr. Friedrich
and Mr. Friedrich’s parents. 107 Thomas was two years old when his
parents decided to separate. 108 Only one week after the separation,
Mrs. Friedrich took Thomas from Germany to her family’s home in
Ohio.109 Before Mrs. Friedrich departed for Ohio with Thomas, Mrs.
Friedrich took Thomas to her army base for four days, where Mr.
Friedrich visited him.110 Mr. Friedrich was not informed that Mrs.
Friedrich was taking their child to Ohio, and he sought the return of
their child.111
The Sixth Circuit examined many factors of Thomas’s life
including the facts that: Thomas was born in Germany, Thomas’s
father is a German citizen, and Thomas’s mother lived exclusively in
Germany.112 Due to these factors, the court held that Thomas’s
habitual residence was in Germany, and the court focused on Thomas’s

99

Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995).
Friedrich v. Friedrich, F.3d 1060 (6th Cir. 1996).
101
Cohen v. Cohen, 858 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir. 2017).
102
983 F.2d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1993).
103
Id. at 1401.
104
Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 1995); Silverman v. Silverman,
338 F.3d 886, 898 (8th Cir. 2003).
105
Friedrich, 938 F.2d at 1398.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 1399.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 1401.
100
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perspective to make this finding. 113 The court stated that the decision
of the habitual residence should be determined by focusing on the
child, “looking back in time, not forward.”114 The court explained why
it focused on the past by reasoning that “[o]n its face, habitual
residence pertains to customary residence prior to removal.” 115 All of
Mrs. Friedrich’s arguments considered her future intentions to move
to the United States; but, the court held that future plans to reside in
the United States were irrelevant to the inquiry because the court looks
to past experiences not future intentions.116
In 1996, Mrs. Friedrich appealed the case on two grounds.117
For the purpose of this Note, only Mrs. Friedrich’s second issue is
relevant, which addresses the issue of, “[w]hen… a court [can] refuse
to return a child who has been wrongfully removed from a country
because return of the abducted child would result in a ‘grave’ risk of
harm.”118 The “grave risk” defense can only be satisfied if there is
clear and convincing evidence that the return of the child would subject
him to physical or psychological harm. 119 The court was not convinced
by this defense and held that Tommy was not at grave risk if he
returned to Germany.120
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decided how a child’s
habitual residence will be determined in Cohen v. Cohen121 in 2017.
Yaccov Cohen, an Israeli citizen, and Ocean Cohen, a dual-citizen of
Israel and the United States, are the parents of O.N.C., who was born
in Israel in 2009.122 For the first three years of O.N.C.’s life, he lived
in Israel until Yaccov and Ocean decided that Ocean and O.N.C. would
move to St. Louis.123 Yaccov was just released from prison and was
unable to leave Israel for a probationary period, but planned to move
to St. Louis after he paid his fines, penalties, and restitution. 124 O.N.C.

113

Id. at 1402.
Id. at 1401.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1063 (6th Cir. 1996).
118
Id.
119
Id. at 1067.
120
Id. at 1069.
121
858 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir. 2017).
122
Id. at 1151.
123
Id.
124
Id.
114
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and Ocean then moved to St. Louis and started a new life.125 O.N.C.
was enrolled in school and speech therapy while Ocean secured
employment and did all things necessary to start a new life in the
United States, including purchasing a vehicle and renting an
apartment.126 Yaccov and Ocean living separately caused their
relationship to deteriorate, and in 2014, Ocean filed for divorce.127
Following the divorce filing, Yaccov filed a request with the
Israeli Ministry of Justice to have O.N.C. returned to Israel under the
Hague Convention.128 Yaccov urged the court to adopt the standard
applied in the Second Circuit, among others, which gives dispositive
weight to parental intent. 129 The Cohen court rejected this view.130
The petitioner must demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that
“the child has been wrongfully removed or retained within the meaning
of the Convention” in order to successfully state a case for the child’s
return.131 The key question in a case dealing with the Convention is
“whether a child has been wrongfully removed from the country of its
habitual residence or wrongfully retained in a country other than of its
habitual residence.”132
In Cohen, the court focused on the
determination of the child’s habitual residence.133 The Eighth Circuit
explained that the “retention of a child in the state of its habitual
residence is not wrongful under the Convention.”134 The Eighth
Circuit agreed that the child’s habitual residence was in the United
States, and therefore held that the District Court for the Eastern District
of Missouri did not err in its decision.135
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit earlier held in Silverman v.
Silverman136 that a child’s habitual residence is determined as of the
time immediately before the removal or retention and depends on past
experiences of the child instead of future intentions of the parents.137
125

Id.
Id. at 1153.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 1154.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 1153 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)).
132
Id. (quoting Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912, 920 (8th Cir. 2010)).
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 1153-54.
136
338 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003).
137
Id. at 897-98.
126
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The court in Silverman determined that a habitual residence
encompasses a form of settled purpose. 138 To establish a settled
purpose, a family must have an adequate degree of continuity in a
specific location, but there is no need for the family to stay in a new
location forever.139 Various factors, including the family’s change in
geography, personal possessions and pets, and period of time can
determine a family’s settled purpose.140 Moreover, the settled purpose
should come from the “child’s perspective, although parental intent
can also be taken into account.”141 In Silverman, the Eighth Circuit
stated that the lower court should have looked at the children’s habitual
residence at the time their mother took them from Israel to the United
States.142 The Eighth Circuit noted that the lower court should keep in
mind that the children can only have one habitual residence. 143
Further, the Eighth Circuit stated that the lower court “should have
determined the degree of settled purpose from the children’s
perspective.”144 The Eighth Circuit seems to find that the settled
purpose gives more credibility to the child’s perspective than it does to
parental intent.145
In contrast, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held in Feder v.
Evans-Feder,146 that “[a] child’s habitual residence is the place where
he or she has been physically present for an amount of time sufficient
for acclimatization and which has a ‘degree of settled purpose’ from
the child’s perspective.”147 In Feder, Edward Feder claimed that
Melissa Evans-Feder wrongfully retained their son in the United States
and petitioned for their son to be returned to Australia.148 The couple
moved to Australia in October of 1993, when Mr. Feder took a job in
Australia and the couple put their Pennsylvania home up for sale. 149
By spring of 1994, their relationship started to deteriorate, and Mrs.
Feder stated that she was unhappy and wanted to move back to the
138

Id. at 898.
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
63 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995).
147
Id. at 224.
148
Id. at 218.
149
Id. at 218-19.
139
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United States.150 Mrs. Feder, knowing that Mr. Feder would not agree
to let her take their son to the United States to live with her, told him
they were going to visit Mrs. Feder’s parents in Pennsylvania. 151 Mrs.
Feder and the child never returned to Australia. 152
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
concluded that the United States was the child’s “habitual
residence.”153 The Third Circuit reversed that decision and held that
Australia was the child’s “habitual residence.” 154 The court declared
that Mrs. Feder’s retention of her son was “wrongful within the
meaning of The Hague Convention.”155 The Third Circuit looked at
factors such as the length of time that the child had lived in Australia,
the fact that he attended preschool in Australia at the time his mother
took him to the United States, and the fact that the parents enrolled
their son in kindergarten for the upcoming school year in Australia. 156
Even though the child only lived in Australia for six months, the court
determined that six months was a significant amount of time for a fouryear-old.157
The court also noted that the child’s residence
immediately prior to the wrongful retention was in Australia. 158
C.

The Combination of Approaches

In 2013, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Redmond v.
Redmond159 attempted to reconcile the two approaches in deciding
where a child should reside and emphasized that a habitual residence
should be a “practical, flexible, factual inquiry.” 160 The court noted
that there should not be a fixed test in place to determine “habitual
residence.”161 This approach to determining habitual residence is
similar to the totality of circumstances approach that the Supreme

150

Id. at 219.
Id. at 220.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 224.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
724 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2013).
160
Id. at 732.
161
Id.
151
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Court used in Monasky v. Taglieri.162 The Seventh Circuit analyzed
both views and concluded that “all circuits [shall] . . . consider both
parental intent and the child’s acclimatization.”163 The only difference
between the split ruling of the jurisdictions is in their emphasis that is
given to the two weighted factors, parental intent and perspective of
the child.164 The Seventh Circuit stated that it has not had the
opportunity to resolve how to balance the parents’ intent and the
child’s perspective.165
IV.

MONASKY V. TAGLIERI OVERRULES MOZES V. MOZES
NINETEEN YEARS LATER IN 2020

Prior to Monasky, the habitual residence was determined using
the framework established in Mozes v. Mozes.166 Arnon Mozes and
Michal Mozes, both Israeli citizens, lived in Israel with their four
children ranging from seven to sixteen years old. 167 All the children
lived in Israel until 1997.168 In April of 1997, with Arnon’s approval,
his wife and the children went to California, while he stayed in
Israel.169 Both parents thought it would be beneficial to enroll the
children in school in America to learn the English language, and they
agreed to have the family live there for fifteen months.170 Arnon
visited California on numerous occasions and paid all the family
expenses both in Israel and California. 171
This case was initiated when Michal Mozes filed for a
dissolution of her marriage to Arnon Mozes. 172 In addition to the
dissolution of marriage, Michal filed for a temporary restraining order
against Arnon to prevent his removal of the children from southern
California.173 Arnon then filed a petition, seeking to have the children
162

Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719, 724 (2020).
Redmond, 724 F.3d at 746.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled by Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719
(2020).
167
Id. at 1069.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id.
163
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returned to Israel under the Hague Convention. 174 The oldest child
elected to return to Israel and did so by mutual agreement of both
parents.175 The District Court for the Central District of California
denied Arnon’s petition for the three younger children to be returned
to Israel.176 Arnon appealed the lower court’s decision.177
The district court declared the children’s habitual residence as
the United States; however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case to determine
whether there was a wrongful retention of the children in the United
States.178 If there was a wrongful retention, the children would return
to Israel with their father. 179
In Mozes, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “a settled intention
to abandon one’s prior habitual residence is a crucial part of acquiring
a new one,” but there are additional factors. 180 The main issue the
Mozes court confronted was, “[w]hose settled intention determines
whether a child has abandoned a prior habitual residence?” 181 The
court in Mozes explained that an “obvious” response to that question
would be to use the child’s intent. 182 The child’s intent would be most
effective because the child would know where he or she feels most at
home.183
However, the Ninth Circuit noted that there is a potential
problem with using the child’s intent. 184 The court held that children
normally lack the material and psychological capacity to decide where
they should reside.185 Therefore, the parents’ intentions are relevant in
deciding the child’s habitual residence. 186
Under the Mozes
framework, if the child cannot decide where to live due to lack of
capacity, the court’s next step is to look at the parents’ intent.187 Two
174

Id.
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 1071, 1084.
179
Id. at 1086.
180
Id. at 1076.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 1078.
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factors are considered when determining parental intent. 188 First, the
parental intent requires “an actual change in geography,” and second,
it requires enough time to pass to enable the child to become
accustomed to the new area.189
The Mozes case is now abrogated by the recent case, Monasky
v. Taglieri.190 Monasky addressed the standard for determining the
habitual residence of a child as well as the standard to review that
finding on appeal.191 Petitioner, Michelle Monasky, was a U.S. citizen
who brought her infant daughter to the United States from Italy after
Michelle suffered from continuous abuse by her husband, Domenico
Taglieri.192 Monasky and Taglieri were married in 2011 and relocated
to Italy two years later, with no intent to move back to the United
States.193 The couple’s marriage started to deteriorate before the birth
of their daughter, and the relationship continued to worsen after she
was born.194 In 2015, Monasky vocalized her desire to divorce Taglieri
and her desire to move back to the United States with their infant
daughter.195 Then, Monasky took her two-month-old daughter and
moved to the United States. 196
Taglieri successfully petitioned the District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio for the return of the infant to Italy under the
Hague Convention.197 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court’s decision. 198 Both courts reasoned that an infant is too
young to get “acclimated to her surroundings” and both courts looked
at the parents’ last shared intent. 199 Both the district court and the Sixth
Circuit determined that, even if Monasky was allowed to unilaterally
change the infant’s “habitual residence,” Monasky ran away to the
United States and had no previous definitive plans to raise their
daughter there.200 The Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s
188

Id.
Id. (citing Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1402 (6th Cir. 1993)).
190
140 S. Ct. 719 (2020).
191
Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719, 723 (2020).
192
Id.
193
Id. at 724.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Id. at 723.
199
Id. at 724.
200
Id. at 725.
189
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decision for clear error, and found no error in the holding.201 The Sixth
Circuit rejected Monasky’s argument that the lower court erred in its
decision that the child’s habitual residence was in Italy because the
parties never had a “‘meeting of the minds’ about their child’s future
home.”202 Monasky successfully petitioned for certiorari.203 The
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to “clarify the
standard for habitual residence.”204
The Court analyzed the phrase “habitual residence.”205 To do
this, the Court first broke down the two words into separate
definitions.206 According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a child “resides”
where he or she lives. 207 A child’s residence can only be deemed
“habitual” when her residence is more than transitory; furthermore, the
word “habitual” implies “customary, usual, of the nature of habit.” 208
The Court, in this definitional analysis, also noted that the Hague
Convention’s text alone does not affirmatively tell us what makes a
child’s residence sufficient to be categorized as “habitual.” 209 The
Justices concluded that the term “habitual” suggests a fact-sensitive
inquiry, which aided them in reaching their holding. 210
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority in this case, stated
that, “[a] child’s habitual residence depends on the totality of the
circumstances specific to the case.” 211 It is not based on categorical
requirements such as an actual agreement between the parents.212 The
Court stated that although the Hague Convention does not define
“habitual residence,” the Convention indicates that it is meant to be
interpreted as where a child is at home. 213 Further, the Court held that
there are no dispositive indicators of an infant’s habitual residence. 214
Alternatively, the Court declared that a wide variety of facts shall be
201

Id.
Id.
203
Id.
204
Id.
205
Id. at 726.
206
Id.
207
Id. (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 1176 (5th ed. 1979)).
208
Id. (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 1176 (5th ed. 1979)).
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id. at 723.
212
Id. at 726.
213
Id.
214
Id.
202

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol38/iss2/9

20

Salvi: Monasky’s Totality of Circumstances

2022

MONASKY’S TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES

745

considered, other than an actual agreement, because surrounding facts
will enable a trier to determine if the infant’s residence has the quality
of being “habitual.”215 The Court did not state specific factors for
determining the totality of circumstances; instead it emphasized that
the determination of habitual residence is a fact-sensitive inquiry.216
The Supreme Court in Monasky did not agree with the court in
Mozes. The court in Mozes gave greater weight to the shared intentions
of the parents; meanwhile, in Monasky, the Justices held that the
decision of a child’s habitual residence is to be determined by a totality
of circumstances.217
V.

HABITUAL RESIDENCE OF INFANTS

Children ages five to seventeen should certainly be able to
decide where they would like to reside once their parents split, and one
parent moves internationally. Children who fall within the grade
school age and above category are capable of determining their
“habitual residence;” therefore, the perspective of children in this age
range should prevail and their preferences should trump all other
circumstances.218 On the other hand, it is a difficult task to determine
the appropriate method to establish the habitual residence for
newborns,219 infants,220 and toddlers.221 Regarding children of this age
bracket, the courts should adopt a view that mirrors the child-centric
standard used for children ages five to seventeen. While it is much
harder to determine a baby’s habitual residence, the same standard
should apply because it is fair to both parents and in the best interest
of the child. Parents should prioritize where the baby feels comfortable
to provide the child with an environment in which to thrive and
succeed.
215

Id. at 729.
Id. at 726.
217
Id.
218
Petronella Grootens-Wiegers et al., Medical Decision-Making in Children and
Adolescents: Developmental and Neuroscientific Aspects, BMC PEDIATRICS (May 8,
2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5422908.
219
Heather Corley, Differences Between a Baby, Newborn, Infant & Toddler, VERY
WELL FAM. (Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.verywellfamily.com/difference-betweenbaby-newborn-infant-toddler-293848 (newborns usually refer to a baby from birth to
two months).
220
Id. (Infants are children anywhere from birth to one year.).
221
Id. (Baby can be used to refer to any child from birth to four years old.).
216
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The child in Delvoye v. Lee222 was a two-month-old
newborn.223 In this case, the parents met in New York in early 2000
and began a romantic relationship. 224 At the time, the petitioner, father,
lived in Belgium and respondent, mother, lived in New York.225 In
August of 2000, the petitioner moved in with the respondent. 226
Shortly after, in September, the couple found out they were expecting
a baby.227 A dispute arose as to where the baby should be born, and
financially, it was a better choice for the respondent to give birth in
Belgium.228 In order to deliver the baby in Belgium, the respondent
received a three-month visa and only packed one or two suitcases,
because she left all of her other belongings in her New York
apartment.229 She also did not renew her visa once it expired. 230 By
the time that the couple’s daughter was born, in May of 2001, the
parties’ relationship had terminated. 231 The father consented to the
mother returning to the United States with the child in July of 2001. 232
The father traveled to New York several times to see his baby and tried
to reconcile, albeit unsuccessfully, with the baby’s mother. 233 The
father then filed a petition to have his baby sent back to Belgium under
the HCCICA.234 The District Court for the District of New Jersey
denied the father’s request and he appealed to the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals.235
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals focused on the
issue of whether the baby was a habitual resident in Belgium when he
was removed to the United States. 236 The Delvoye court faced a
troubling issue of whether a very young infant can even acquire a
“habitual residence.”237 When addressing the issue, the court relied on
222

329 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2003).
Id. at 332.
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its prior holding in Feder-Evans.238 In Feder-Evans, the court held
that “[a] child’s habitual residence is the place where he . . . has been
physically present for an amount of time sufficient for acclimatization
and which has a ‘degree of settled purpose’ from the child’s
perspective.”239
The Third Circuit adhered to its precedent and used the same
standard for determining where an infant’s habitual residence is
located.240 The court looked to an English court and an Australian
court for assistance. 241
An English court has said: “The habitual residence of
the child is where it last had a settled home which was
in essence where the matrimonial home was.” And an
Australian court has said that: “A young child cannot
acquire habitual residence in isolation from those who
care for him. While ‘A’ lived with both parents, he
shared their common habitual residence or lack of
it.”242
Both the English and Australian courts provided insightful definitions
of habitual residence for infants from their countries’ views, which
assisted the Third Circuit in reaching a decision. Both definitions
provide a bright-line rule to determine the child’s habitual residence,
which would be useful in the American court system. The English
court uses the phrase “matrimonial home.” 243 Problems may arise
when one party argues that the home is a temporary matrimonial
dwelling. The court will have to assess the evidence and decide if the
parties intended for the residence to be permanent.
If a matrimonial home exists, then both parents share a settled
intent to reside there, and it simply calls for application of the Hague
Convention to determine the child’s “habitual residence.” 244 However,
this case is more difficult because the plain “fact that conflict has
developed between the parents” does not discontinue a child’s habitual
residence, if it is already in existence. 245 The child may never adopt a
238

Id.
Id. (quoting Feder, 63 F.3d at 224).
240
Delvoye, 329 F.3d at 333.
241
Id.
242
Id. (quoting Dickson v. Dickson, 1990 SCLR 692; Re F (1991) 1 F.L.R. 548, 551).
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Id.
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Id.
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habitual residence if the parental conflict arises at the same time as the
child’s birth.246 The court explained that parental conflict at the time
of the child’s birth does not result in the child automatically assuming
the habitual residence of his or her mother. 247 In Delvoye, the
petitioner traveled to Belgium to deliver the baby for financial reasons
and only intended to stay in Belgium for a short period of time.248 She
lived out of a suitcase while in Belgium; meanwhile, she kept her
apartment in New York where she left most of her belongings.249
Therefore, there was not enough of a common purpose between the
parents for Belgium to become their “habitual residence.” 250
The facts in Delvoye are distinguishable from those in NunezEscudero v. Tice-Menley,251 decided by the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals.252 In Nunez-Escudero, the father, a Mexican citizen, alleged
that the mother of his infant son wrongfully removed his child from
Mexico and petitioned for his return.253 Before the petitioner and
respondent separated, they were married and lived together in Mexico
for nearly a year before their son was born. 254 Two months after the
baby was born, the mother, a citizen of the United States, left Mexico
with her infant son and returned to Minnesota where she previously
resided with her parents. 255 In order for the child to be returned to
Mexico, the father needed to prove that the child’s mother removed
him from his “habitual residence.” 256 If, by a preponderance of the
evidence, the father was able to demonstrate that the child’s habitual
residence was in Mexico, then the mother would have had the burden
to show by clear and convincing evidence that an exception exists for
her case.257 If the mother was able to meet her burden, then the child
246

Id.
Id.
248
Id. at 334.
249
Id.
250
Id.
251
58 F.3d 374 (8th Cir. 1995).
252
Id. at 375.
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
Id.
256
Id.
257
Id. (Article 13 of the Hague Convention provides two exceptions for when “the
judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the
return of the child.” These exceptions must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. The first exception is if “the person, institution or other body having the
care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the
247
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would have remained in the United States. 258 The District Court for
the District of Minnesota held that the mother successfully established
an exception by clear and convincing evidence, but the father appealed
that decision.259
The father argued on appeal that the district court only
considered evidence relevant to a custody arrangement and failed to
apply the Hague Convention. 260 He further argued that “a child can
only be exposed to a grave risk of harm under Article 13b if the
habitual residence cannot protect the child.” 261 The Eighth Circuit
found that the district court incorrectly assessed the gravity of risk to
the child when evaluating the effects of a possible separation of the
child from his mother.262
The mother in this case offered some evidence to show that the
baby could be subject to a “grave risk of physical or psychological
harm or be placed in an intolerable situation,” but the court held that it
was insufficient to meet the exception because it was too general.263
Further, the evidence focused primarily on the problems between TiceMenley and Nunez, and Tice-Menley did not offer any evidence of
how the child would be at grave risk as a result of the separation. 264
Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit rejected the father’s argument,
and remanded the case for further proceedings.265 The court provided
that “in determining grave risk, Article 13 requires the court to evaluate
the surroundings to which the child is to be sent and basic personal
qualities of those located there.”266 On remand, the mother, by clear
and convincing evidence, was required to prove that the return of her
son to Mexico would subject him to “a grave risk of harm or otherwise
place him in an intolerable situation.”267 Additionally, the Eighth

time of removal or retention or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the
removal or retention.” The second exception is if “there is a grave risk that his or her
return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place
the child in an intolerable situation.”).
258
Id.
259
Id. at 375.
260
Id. at 376.
261
Id.
262
Id. at 377.
263
Id.
264
Id. at 377.
265
Id.
266
Id. (Currier v. Currier, 845 F. Supp. 916, 923 (D.N.H. 1994)).
267
Id. at 378.
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Circuit held that it could not affirm the district court’s ruling on an
alternative ground that the father “failed to establish Mexico as the
child’s habitual residence.”268 The Eighth Circuit noted that the lower
court must make a ruling on the habitual residence of the child first. 269
VI.

FUTURE PROBLEMS FROM THE MONASKY CASE

Monasky is an impractical ruling because it provides
insufficient guidance to lower courts. The Supreme Court should have
adopted the child’s perspective, which should be determined by
objective factors. There needs to be a bright-line rule. Families that
are struggling with divorces are being hurt by this ruling, especially
the children involved in habitual residence cases. Children and parents
will undergo a great amount of stress due to the Court’s failure. 270
Further, this ruling will create financial burden for parents. 271
Children do not choose for their parents to divorce, but, as a
result of the divorce, countless numbers of children are left hurt and
vulnerable.272 There are devastating effects of divorce on both parents
and children which tend to weaken the parent-child relationship.273 In
many cases, a child’s life completely changes when parents get a
divorce, and the transition can be very difficult for a child. 274
Frequently in divorce cases, the child is forced to move; moreover, the
child has to live with one parent while having visitation with the

268

Id.
Id. at 379.
270
Amy Morin, The Psychological Effects of Divorce on Children, VERY WELL FAM.
(Feb. 21, 2021), https://www.verywellfamily.com/psychological-effects-of-divorceon-kids-4140170.
271
Timothy Weinstein, The Financial Cost of Child Abduction, B RING SEAN HOME
FOUND., (last updated December 2013), http://bringseanhome.org/resources/the-leftbehind-parent/the-financial-cost-of-child-abduction.
272
Lori Rappaport, Understanding Children’s Reactions to Divorce, GROWING UP
GREAT
(last
visited
Apr.
6,
2021),
http://www.growingupgreat.com/html/handouts/divorce.htm.
273
Sylvia Smith, Challenges that Children of Divorced Parents Face in their
Adulthood,
MARRIAGE
(June
12,
2020),
https://www.marriage.com/advice/divorce/challenges-that-children-of-divorceface-in-their-adulthood (“Resent of parents can be a facet of the Adult Child of
Divorce’s relationship with their parents.”).
274
D’Arcy Lyness, Helping Your Child Through a Divorce, KIDSHEALTH (Jan.
2015), https://kidshealth.org/en/parents/help-child-divorce.html.
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other.275 Although divorced parents in many instances decide to have
joint custody of the children, the total number of custodial parents in
the United States is approximately 12.9 million, and 79.9% of
custodial parents in the United States are mothers.276 A custodial
parent is a parent who, by court order “has either sole or primary
physical custody of a child, and is the parent the child spends most of
the time with.”277 Shockingly, only forty percent of the states in the
United States aim to give children equal time with both parents. 278 In
cases dealing with “habitual residence,” when one parent moves to
another country, this forced move for the child makes it even more
devastating for families.279
If the Court adopted the child’s perspective rule, deciding the
child’s habitual residence would be fair and would accurately depict
what the child wants. Courts would look at where the child feels at
home. Further, if the child is speaking age, a judge or an attorney for
the child can have a conversation with the child directly. Although it
may be devastating news for a parent to know that his or her child
wants to live in one place instead of the other, at least the parent can
walk away knowing that the child is happy and feels at home.
However, the court system remains confused. The same case with the
same facts decided in one jurisdiction could have a different result if
heard in another jurisdiction. Due to the potential severity of this issue,
there needs to be a uniform method for courts to decide habitual
residence cases. A uniform procedure would alleviate stress for all
parties involved and reduce the financial burdens of going to court and
the subsequent appeals.

Lili A. Vasileff, Relocating with Children After Divorce, FIN. PLAN. ASS’N (Jan.
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VII.

THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING OF “TOTALITY OF
CIRCUMSTANCES” IS VAGUE AND TROUBLESOME

Vol. 38

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Monasky v. Taglieri
to clarify the standard for habitual residence for minors and address the
different opinions among the circuit courts. 280 The Supreme Court
particularly addressed Mozes v. Mozes and Redmond v. Redmond and
analyzed their different approaches. In Mozes, the court placed greater
weight on the shared intentions of the parents; meanwhile, the court in
Redmond rejected the “rigid rules, formulas, or presumptions.” 281
Ultimately, the Court held that the child’s habitual residence depends
on the particular circumstances of each case, and each case is
different.282 The Court stated that the habitual residence of a child is a
mixed question of law and fact; therefore, a bright line rule is not
appropriate.283 The Supreme Court’s vague ruling does not change the
circuit split and leaves the jurisdictions divided. The Supreme Court
could have avoided this entire problem by taking a clear stance on the
issue and applying the correct standard. The vagueness of the Supreme
Court’s previous ruling creates great uncertainty and fear for parents
knowing that their child’s fate could be entirely different if the case
were tried in another circuit. As such, the country needs a uniform rule
on this issue.
The Supreme Court failed by not taking the view that habitual
residence should be determined from the child’s perspective. The
Court in Monasky held that a child’s habitual residence was not based
on an actual agreement between the parents on where to raise the child,
but instead depended on the totality of circumstances. 284 This decision
does not seem to take the children’s perspective into account at all. A
child’s life is turned upside down when his or her parents split up,
which is why the child’s best interest should be determined based on
the child’s perspective in determining where the child wishes to
reside.285 The least that the Court can do is decide the habitual
residence from the eyes of the child. In Cohen, the Eighth Circuit made
its determination by focusing on different factors including where the
280
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child went to school, where his pediatrician was, if he had extended
family or friends in the area, if he participated in activities, and what
language the child mostly spoke.286 The Eighth Circuit adopted the
proper approach.
The Court did not provide guidance to the lower courts about
what to do in close cases. The Court could have helped lower courts
if it clarified whether courts should look towards parental intent or the
child’s perspective in situations when courts are struggling to
determine the child’s habitual residence. If the Supreme Court
provided a bright line rule, it would have been much easier for the
courts to make uniform decisions. Due to this uncertainty, nothing will
change in the circuit split. Considering the high rate of divorce and the
ease of international travel, wrongfully retained or not, habitual
residence of a child should be decided from the child’s perspective and
based on objective factors.
The Court should have used the opportunity it was recently
granted in Monasky to explain the changing times. A child can travel
at ease when visiting the parent he or she does not live with, and the
parent can travel to where the child is. Furthermore, advanced
technology allows children to see their parents via Facetime or Zoom.
With the ease of travel and advanced technology that allow children to
virtually see their parents, the children should decide where their
habitual residence is. In modern times, it is easy to stay connected with
parents and loved ones via the Internet and cell phones.287 The Hague
Convention, along with many cases regarding habitual residence of a
child, dates back prior to the existence of Facetime and Zoom. 288
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court had decades to fix the issue of determining
a child’s habitual residence under the Hague Convention, but when it
286
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finally had the opportunity in 2020, the justices issued an ineffective
ruling. The Court should have given greater weight to the child’s
perspective, considering the fact that it is the child’s life that is being
completely altered due to their parents’ split, especially when a parent
moves out of the country.
Instead, the Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have issued the
correct rule to determine the habitual residence of a child: the childcentric focus that the Supreme Court should have adopted. The
Supreme Court’s decision that a child’s habitual residence should be
determined based on the “totality of circumstances” is overbroad and
will have little effect on future decisions in the lower courts. Due to
this overbroad rule, the Supreme Court sadly missed the opportunity
to effectively rule on this issue. Through this missed opportunity, the
Court also failed to provide enough information to resolve the circuit
split which will continue to haunt the lower courts in their future
decisions for years to come. As a result, the confusion and chaos will
only continue.
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